Formal game
Payoff matrix
Each cell is (Agent A payoff, Agent B payoff).
| A \ B | Research | Skip |
|---|---|---|
| Research | ||
| Skip |
Model inputs
Choose V and c
Strategic outcome
Equilibrium analysis
Pure Nash equilibria
Symmetric mixed equilibrium
Best responses
Why free-riding appears
If B researches
If B skips
This is a formal model result, not observed behavior.
Cost sensitivity
Mixed-strategy benchmark
For 0 < c < V, p(Research)=1-c/V.
Three interdisciplinary lenses
Economics
Private cost + shared benefit · Free-riding · Best responses · Nash equilibrium
Computation
Payoff matrix · Algorithmic checks · Verified baseline · Cost sensitivity
Behavior
Beliefs · Bounded strategic reasoning · Future empirical comparison
PLANNED / NOT YET TESTEDEvidence status
Verified in this project
- Formal payoff model
- Pure-equilibrium computation
- NashPy baseline comparison
- Mixed-equilibrium derivation
- Cost sweep
- Automated tests
Not tested
- Human behavior
- LLM-agent behavior
- Educational effectiveness
Open research artifacts